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Claims by native peoples to land and its products in former colonies that 
are now developed industrial nations (particularly Australia, Canada, and the 
United States) are of necessity argued in terms of legal systems introduced by 
Europeans and institutionalized in those countries. Evidence from the recent 
prehistory of these native peoples and from the history of their co-lonial 
encounters may be admissable as evidence but not as structutal components of 
arguments for 'inherent native land rights. Native property relations' and 
their adjudication in precolonial times are, inter alia, of only secondary 
consequence in these cases. It is this fact, perhaps, that has conditioned 
many anthropologists from Western countries to view African forager relations 
to land in normative, rule-centered, functionally specific terms analogous to 
to those of European-American law. 
As long ago as 1957, Bohannon argued that it is inappropriate to transfer 
in this manner these conceptual and institutional categories of Western law to 
African societies (see also Bohannon 19 65). In that same year, V, Turner 
(1957) following on Colson's (1953) earlier study, demonstrated that in some 
African societies, at least, cooperation in and competition for such assets as 
land are constrained by a prevailing structure of relations that can only be 
understood in the context of extended social processes. Comaroff and Roberts 
(1981) locate the field in which persons negotiate their social universe in 
the conjunction of these processes with surface features of rules. In their 
analysis of Tswana social order, they demonstrate the necessary dialectical 
nature of this conjunction. 
Nevertheless, despite sixty years of intensive development of this proces-
sual paradigm that owes little or nothing to Western legal theory (Malinowski 
1926; see Comaroff and Roberts 1981:11-17 for a summary history of this deve-
lopment), derivative Western formal models have been implicitly applied to the 
foraging societies of southern Africa. This transferral has taken place with 
little recourse to the political and legal theories from which it is drawn and 
with less consideration for the African context of San peoples who constitute 
these societies. Silberbauer (1982), alone among students of the San, cites 
political theorists but no work on law or its application. Lee (1982, 197~) 
does invoke marxian theorists but draws on the ecologically functional compo-
nents of their models in a utilitarian manner, Even when these authors make 
concerted efforts to dissociate San property-status frameworks and forms of 
ownership from those of Europe and the "developed" world, their attempts take 
the form of normative contrasts to an Anglo-American model (Silberbauer 1982; 
Lee 1982, 1979, 1972) rather than analyses of the native African matrix within 
which San systems are historically set. Thus, Leacock and Lee (1982:10) are 
able to assert the anomaly that means for resolving interpersonal conflicts 
are necessary in San societies whose members are "free from fundamental con-
flicts of interest." They are able to do so because they apply a Western 
jural mode'l of conflict and decision-making to these societies in which both 
the nature of interests and the concept of what constitutes resolutions are 
fundamentally different from Western modes, 
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In countries like Botswana, moreover, native institutions continue to 
provide - as they did in the colonial and precolonial past - the first avenue 
of redress as well as the lower levels of appeal for all common-law, most 
civil-law, and some criminal-law categories of cases. Traditional Tswana 
courts (dikgotla) presided over by a hierarchy of chiefs, local chiefs, and 
headmen (dikgosi, dikgosana, basimane) hear disputes not only of Tswana liti-
gants but also those of all subordinate groups within the country. Only at 
the higher levels of state jurisdiction does European law (Dutch-Roman law in 
this case) come into prominence. It is, thus, important to understand the 
relation of various native systems to each other both in the contemporary 
situation and in its historical development. 
Furthermore, although all persons in Botswana who are native to that coun-
try, regardless to which linguistic/ethnic group they may belong, are granted 
full citizenship status by the national constitution, several groups are, 
nevertheless, in practice, excluded from full participatory status - espe-
cially in the realms of economic opportunity and land rights - on grounds that 
they did not in the past and do not now have inherent land tenure and politi-
cal structures that would admit them to equality in these regards (Hitchcock 
1980:24). 'The arguments advanced echo those quoted by Asch (in press) from 
the colonial context of Canada. Exclusion in Namibia - where San also live in 
considerable numbers - and the reasons for it are, of course, much more sev-
ere, but s·imilar notions of social naYvtte attributed to subordinate peoples 
are significant parts of the underlying rationale. 
In Botswana, San (who constitute approximately three percent of that coun-
try's population) are particularly disadvantaged on these grounds as compared 
with other groups in the country. To correct this imbalance and to bring San 
into active participation in Botswana's political economy, it is necessary to 
examine first, the native legal frameworks of all peoples concerned, not only 
of San; second, the history of association of these peoples; third, the colon-
ial system superimposed on these frameworks; fourth, the anthropological in-
terpretations that have been offered concerning these frameworks and this 
history. These consideration have both theoretical and practical entail-
ments. Theoretically, they add a social-political dimension that has been 
subordinated in the evolutionary-ecological models uniformly employed in rec-
ent forager studies. Practically, they contribute to current debates over San 
status in the modern national state of Botswana, to further extension of that 
debate in an independent Namibia, and - by association - to similar debates 
elsewhere. 
It should raise no controversy to state that anthropological approaches to 
social mechanisms of San land distribution have tended to treat San groups as 
sociocultural isolates which have been insulated until comparatively recent 
decades from contacts with other peoples, whether African or European. Accor-
dingly, San relations to land have been seen as entirely autochthonous in 
origin and development. The underlying motive forces forming these relations 
have been attributed to principally ecological imperatives centered on res-
ource procurement necessities (Meillassoux 196 7, 1972; Lee 1979; Silberbauer 
1981; Tanaka 1980; Cashden 1982). Lee and Maillassoux, especially, follow 
Marx (1867) in finding ecological necessity to be the driving force of forager 
social and cultural forms. 
San land tenure, however, far from being an ecological given, ,is part of 
that social universe negotiated by San persons in their day-to-day interrela-
tions with each other. Furthermore, San are not "friee from fundamental 
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conflicts of interest," as Lee's own descriptions as well as those of other 
authors forcefully show. Land, and rights to its access and use, is a conti-
nually recurring factor in these negotiations. It goes without saying that 
San have developed inherent political structures for organizing these negotia-
tions both in their internal dimensions and in relation to other peoples whose 
distribution overlaps or interlayers with San geographical space. 
Consequently, it is necessary to examine the comparative systematic simi-
larities of San social relations to land with those of other southern African 
groups. In stressing these similarities, I am aware of the danger of imposing 
structural uniformity where none exists and have tried to avoid tendencies in 
that direction. I do not envision anything like "a San system of land tenure" 
much less that it might be simply a subspecies of southern Bantu - or Tswana 
or Herero or whatever - systems. Nor· by drawing on some principles adduced 
for other societies do I intend to suggest that the structure of San land 
tenure can be comprehended entirely in models derived for those societies. 
Indeed, I specifically reject ~he applicability to San systems of significant 
parts of those models. I wish only to demonstrate that San systems, although 
exhibiting important distinctive features, share with other systems a number 
of equally important common principles for relating persons to place. These 
common elements have their ontogeny in a long history of association among 
these groups, a history that has been distort_ed by colonial interventions 
which have obscured longer-term regularities. This has been a result both of 
the administration of intended policies of political differentiation and of a 
corollary consequence of competitive capitalism. 
Also obscured is the fact that San social relations to land and the struc-
tures for confirming these relations are as fully developed as are those of 
their neighbors witn which there is significant congruence. The establishment 
of this point undermines arguments of San inequality in this regard. It is to 
this rather than to a postulated unproblematic relationship or a shared corpus 
juris among the examined systems that this essay is addressed. The histories 
of these peoples and the colonial system as it impinged on them are considere~ 
in companion papers (Wilmsen 1984a, 1984b). 
Ecological and Marxian Models 
There is virtually nothing to distinguish ecological and marxian motlels as 
they have been applied to foragers. This is no accident. Both are founded on 
the premise that for foragers "reproduction of the means of subsistence is 
left to nature" ( Lee 1979: 117). Upon this base rises a superstructure of 
sociality and ideology: "foragers must fit their organization into the niches 
afforded by nature" (Lee 1979: 117, see also page 4). I have criticized the 
ecological components of these models (Wilmsen 1983); it is enough to observe 
here that the San have been particularly tyrannized by attempts to find in 
contemporary foragers insights into cultural evolution (Lee 1965:1-3), the 
original configuration of human society (Tanaka 1980:xi), and the technologi-
cal cum environmental drive which White (1943) - and Steward (1955) - saw to 
be primary in shaping human social life (Silberbauer 1981:30-31). Lee (1979) 
makes a serious effort to wed · these ecological components to their marxian 
analogues. We may turn directly to the marxiari models. 
Meillassoux (1967, 1972, 1973) anticipated Lee; his construction is based 
on a literal reading of Marx's distinction between land as a subject of labor 
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and land as an instrument of labor (Meillassoux 1980:194). He says, "the use 
of land as subject of labor [original italics] amounts solely to the extrac-
tion of the necessities of life from it, as it is the case with hunting or 
collecting" (Meillassoux 1980:194). Such use fosters "instananeous" produc-
tion which, once shared, frees the hunters from "any further reciprocal obli-
gation or allegiance" (1980:194). There is no ground for the emergence even 
of extended family organization at this forager level: "The basic social -unit 
is an egalitarian but unstable band with little concern for biological or 
social reproduction" (Meillassoux 1972:99). Only with the emergence of agri-
culture is the material base available for "the emergence of the 'family' as a 
productive and cohesive unit and of 'kinship' as an ideology" (1972:99, origi-
nal italics). Obviously, there can be no basis for land tenure among foragers 
so conceived. This conception was, of course, in error when it was born, as 
even a superficial examination of the results of decades of condensed research 
in Man the Hunter (Lee and De Vore 1968) reveals. Earlier, Sahlins (1965), 
dismissed by Meillassoux as a "liberal economist," had offered a theoretical 
formulation of the role of kinship reciprocity in forager society, Prior to 
that, Marshall (1961) had presented an empirical description of such recipro-
city for !kung San. Both absolutely contradict Meillassoux's formulation. 
Lee does not fall victim to this error when he appropriates key elements 
of Meillassoux I s construction. He recognizes forager social integrity (Lee 
1979:117 ff). He subordinates this integrity, however, by offering a forager 
mode of production the five components of which are a hierarchical construct 
based on environmental constants, In this, he follows quite faithfully the 
lead offered a decade earlier by Meillassoux as well as by Terray (1972). 
Taylor (1979:150-163) carefully dissects this approach and finds it to be 
reducible to the identification of elements and their combination in a process 
of production, in more simple terms, a typology. As with all typologies, this 
one obscures the basis for analyzing social relations which is .presumably its 
intended purpose. Similarly, Godelier (1973, 1975) reduces human social rela-
tions to the product of the evolutio.n of chronologically antecedent forms 
which develop in response to functional constraints imposed by a combination 
of environmental and technological forces (cf. Taylor 1979:157-163); foragers 
are way down on the scale (cf, Kahn and Llobera 1981: 298). Clearly, these 
constructions are all legacies of Morgan (1963) descended through Engels (1972 
(1891]) in the marxian geneology and through Steward (1955) in ecology to 
their multilineal standpoints of today (Wilmsen 1983a; Schire 1980; Perper and 
Schrire 1977). Attempts to insert social dimensions more firmly into these 
marxian-evolutionary schemes (cf, Keenan 1981) have been hampered both by 
inadequate ethnography and by underdeveloped theory. 
This is not to assert that social dimensions are categorically excluded by 
students of the San. Silberbauer (1982: 28, 33-34) speaks of factions, cli-
ques, the exercise of political power, and strategies for decision making 
among the g\wi (Lee 1982:52-53) mentions multiple options exercized by indivi-
duals in a number of social situations and (in apparent contradiction to the 
denial, mentioned above, that foragers may have fundamental conflicts of in-
terest) strategies of competition among !kung groups for recruitment of mem-
bers. But Silberbauer (1982:24) sees these things as gJwi 'manipulating their 
society to fit their environmental requirements, while Lee (1982:53) finds 
that the characteristics of foraging life lead to shallow spans of social 
continuity (1979:60-61) and - although he subsequently appears to have changed 
his mind (Lee 1982:46) - to political egalitarianism (1982:53-55). This brings 
him back suspiciously close to Meillassoux' s position. Similar views are put 
forth by Yellen (1976) and Tanaka (1980). 
tifies the environmental determinism of 
1983a). 
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Barnard (1979: 131) correctly iden-
these authors (cf. Wilmsen 1980, 
It is, thus, no distortion to claim along with Taylor (1979:162) that in 
all these studies "phenomena such as kinship, religion, etc. are analyzed as 
'functional necessities' in relation to the level of productive forces" (em-
phasis in the original). Or, in Williams' (1977:75-82) terms, an economic/ 
ecological productive ''base" is objectified with the result that all varia-
tions in social relations are reduced to secondary consequences. From this 
perspective, it is easy to view continuity in social relations as reflecting 
stability in ecological conditions with perturbations tending to oscillate 
around some equilibrium state, and for change to be seen as adjustments to 
external impositions - either drastic alterations in the productive base or 
injection of disruptive forms. There can be no doubt that conditions both of 
continuity and of crisis have characterized the past and continue to charac-
terize the present for forager societies. These societies have, consequently, 
developed a repertoire for anticipating and managing a wide range of contin-
gencies. What has been missing in studies of these repertoires is close at-
tention to the constraints that social relations themselves impose on the 
forces of production, or, more cogently, the dynamic connection - the dialec-
tic - between social relations of producton and the productive environment. 
Attention to these connections opens the way to analyzing their integral coor-
dination in specific societies. Paradoxically, for foragers, it has been 
concern, recently developed, for the articulation of remnant forager societies 
within modern capitalist states that has pointed to the most rewarding direc-
tion in which to pursue these analyses. 
Theoretical considerations 
The constitution of land tenure in San societies is the logical locus for 
this investigation because, in contrast to the ecological concept of territory 
which focuses on productivity and the means of production, it locates people 
within the social matrix of relations to land within which productive activity 
. must take place. Hitchcock (1980:23) notes that virtually every anthropolo-
gist who has worked in the Kalahari has mentioned the existence of San terri-
tories; however, the distinction between these applied model concepts of eco-
logical territoriality and indigenous San conceptions of land tenure was posed 
first by Wilmsen (1976) i~ a report to the government of Botswana and later, 
in 1977, by Hitchcock, Vierich, and Wilmsen (in press) at the first Botswana 
National Migration workshop. Theoretical arguments on which this distinction 
is based were developed further at the Botswana Society Symposium on Settle-
ment (Wilmsen 1982b) and in the final compilation of the National Migration 
Study (Wilmsen 1982a). 
In light of the above discussion, it is not surprising that the structure 
of San land tenure has been overlooked. Marshall (1960, 1976), Lee (1965, 
1979), Yellen (1976), and Yellen and Harpending (1972) include sections on 
spatial distributions of !kung as do Silberbauer (1965, 1981) and. Tanaka 
(1969, 1980) for the glwi, Heinz for the !XO, and Cashd~ (1984) for the 
gl\anna. All these authors look upon their subject group in isolation and offer 
no more than generalizations drawn from limited descriptions of a few particu-
lar cases. Barnard (1979) makes a similar point. Moreover, Marshall aitd Lee 
- whose publications on this topic are the most extensive to date - limit 
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their understanding of underlying San conceptions of ownership because they 
consider San to be members of separate enclaves, until very recently dissoci-
ated from their neighbors. They have, therefore, not noticed that San share 
structural elements of ownership and tenure common to a number of societies in 
southern Africa; accordingly, they misconstrue San land tenure practice as 
well as its interdigitation with other systems. On the other hand, Wiessner 
(1977, 1982) successfully places some aspects of San settlement dynamics in a 
broader social context, and Hitchcock (1978, 1980) firmly anchors contemporary. 
San relations to land in the context of dominant Bantu systems, Hitchcock 
gives excellent descriptions of interlocking San and Tswana customary claims 
to land ownership at the local level and shows how this differs from higher 
level administrative views on the matter, but he does not attempt to develop a 
basis for San customary claims (other than presence on a specific parcel of 
land, an argument that can be - and is - negated by assertions that this pre-
sence is the result of squatting and not of tenure). 
We must search elsewhere. By definition, non-1 iterate societies do not 
keep written codifications of their constitutive principles of ownership. The 
only avenue for comprehending these principles in such societies is to examine 
the logic of social relations which govern thei.r ownership and its extensions 
without forcing it entirely into a Western model, Harris and Young (1981:127-
128) relate Gluckman' s analysis of links between kinship and ownership to 
labor processes and thus carry it a step further into the realm of social 
production. I shall return to this extension as it applies to San. 
The argument may be distilled as follows: 
Property law in tribal societies defines not so much 
rights of persons over things, as obligations owed bet-
ween persons with respect of things.... The crucial 
rights of such persons are demands on other persons in 
virtue of control over land and chattels, not any 
set of persons, but persons related in specific, long-
standing ways •••• To understand the holding of property, 
we must investigate the system of status relationships; 
we must deal constantly with relations to property 
(Gluckman 1971:45-46). 
Ownership in such societies cannot be absolute because property acquires its 
critical role in a specific nexus of relationships. Under these circum-
stances, there can be no definition of ownership in a sense of incontestable 
control over property. Rather, ownership involves being bound within a set of 
reciprocal obligations among persons and things; everything, and especially 
land and the right to its use, must be subject to a complex of claims arising 
from the social matrix. In essence, ownership is a flexibly defined right 
over someone or something in terms of social status: "rights to property , •• 
are attributes of social position" (Gluckman 1965:163). 
Gluckman did not employ a dialectic vocabulary, nor did he participate in 
a dialectic tradition, yet the essential dialectic dynamic of property is 
apparent in his formulation: the reciprocal discourse among members of a 
social universe conducted in historical not mechanical nature, It is this 
dialectic element that I take from Gluckman, For foragers, as for anybody 
else, persons create property. They create it in reference to each other, not 
in reference to space or the use of objects in space,. Use, production, takes· 
7 
place within a conception of property - within a conception of persons in 
relation to each other with respect to place. Within that conception, the 
social rules and processes of the relations of production are as fully articu-
lated for foragrers as for anybody else. This crucial and self-evident point 
is subverted in ecological marxian models of forager cultural order. 
I should make it clear that I depart from Gluckman's construction in two 
important ways. First, no codified corpus juris such as he seems to have 
found among the Barotse can be attributed to San, or for that matter, to Here-
ra or Batswana (cf. Comaroff and Roberts 1981) who will also be considered in 
this paper; I neither make that attribution nor follow an analytical procedure 
that requires it. Second, Gluckman assigned major importance for property 
relations to the status· hierarchy inherent in Barotse social organization and 
considered rights to land to be held in a graded arrangement of administrative 
estates. Aside from the fact that this assessment has been criticized (White 
1963; Biebuyck 1963; see Comaroff and Roberts 1981:5-11 for an extensive eva-
luation of the controversy), no status hierarchies can be attributed to San or 
Herera (Tswana do have them) and I do no.t adopt that aspect of Gluckman' s 
model. 
Instead, I take the "attributes of social position" by which rights to 
property are obtained to be entailed simply by virtue of native membership in 
a group, that is, by ascription at birth or adoptive incorporation into a 
specific set of related persons. Acquisition of new status by a person is 
constrained in scope and direction by that person's initial membership in such 
a group and, hence, is an extension of ascription (cf. Comaroff 1978). Aban-
donment of hierarchical ladders does not impair the theoretical foundation for 
the argument to follow. On the contrary, it opens the possibility of a more 
fundamental analysis of the way in which property is woven into the social 
fabric of forager society. As will become clear, flexibility of spatial org-
anization for San - and for Herera and Tswana - rests on a fluid and negoti-
able social field in which a repertoire of rules is constantly activated and 
continually reassessed by individuals in the course of everyday interactions. 
In this social field, "norm and reality exist in a necessary dialectical rela-
tionship" (Comaroff and Roberts 1981: 247) that gives form to the San uni-
verse. That social field must be brought into prominence in order to set 
equally variable functions of production in their proper context. For San, it 
must also be made comprehensible within the broader social sphere of southern 
Africa in which ·it has always existed. This is especially urgent today when a 
centuries-old legacy of precapitalist and capitalist disenfranchisement is 
being legitimated in legislation for lack of well-grounded and persuasive 
arguments that this dispossession should be corrected rather than concretized 
(cf. Hitchcock 1980). Gluckman's insight, modified as mentioned, provides an 
indispensible first guide to this endeavor. 
As I see it, the principal heuristic value of Gluckman's effort is that it 
stresses the flexible quality of property rules and the leeway allowed in 
their application during negotiation of individual cases. Theoretically, by 
identifying the dialectic between person and property mediated in a social 
field, it restores kinship to that central logic of forager cultural relations 
from which it has b~en analytically divorced by ecological-marxian end.eavors. 
Beyond that, and more important in the overall scheme of things, read in 
this way property is removed from the arena of pursuit. of means to overcome 
necessity and is situated where it is in fact created: in the cultural defi-
nition of how these means are to be pursued. Forager relations to prope.rty 
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(land, chattels, and the rest) can then be seen as inhering not in a different 
natural order but in a cultural order that organizes persons and relations of 
production differently. To at once rescue San from Western legal institutions 
and to dig them from the teleological grave in which they have been buried 
before they are dead is to open the way to their culture in terms of its own 
structure set in the concrete locus of its African history. 
San Land Tenure 
' The initial discussion will center on ~u I 'h~asi San relations to land; 
subsequently, the systems of other San groups and of Herero wull be summarized 
and their congruence with that of lu will be made clear. Finally, the under-
lying principles of kinship and membership in a group as the basis for tenure' 
rights in these systems will be shown to be compatible in essentials with 
those of Tswana land tenure. 
The fu \ •~asi, better known in anthropolei.gical literature as !kung, live 
now in Botswana and Namibia between roughly 19°S - 22° S and 19°E - 22°E. 
This area has been labelled variously the Nyae Nyae "(Marshall 1976) or the, 
Dobe (Lee 1979) region. The word !kung is an anglicized rendition of !xu' 
which means I speech/language' in a regional variant of !kung spoken mainly in 
Angola; this word (!kung) is used by linguists to designate the group of nor-
thern Bush languages (Vedder 1910; Bleek 1929; Westphal 196,:3) spoken in Bot-
swana~ Namibia, and Angola. Snyman (1970) originally used !xfl" to designate 
¥uj'h'cl'asi in his grammar of that language but has since changed to the latter 
term (Snyman 1975). The San people within the coordinates indicated inv,:Jri-
ably use fu I h~asi e,S the designation for themselves and their language (zu = 
perso~, people; \ 'hl>'a = real, true, complete; si = plural suffix: h~nce, 
~ul'hoasi = completed or true people). For this reason, I use ~u)'hci'asi 
as the name of these people and for simplicity in presentation abbreviate it 
to ~u, a convention which is in keeping with their own usage. 
,/ ' 
Zu \ 'h'oa.si Spatial Organization 
There is agreement among researchers on the ecological-geographical corre-
lates of tu land division: space is partitioned such that each demarcated 
section of land contains enough food and water resources to sustain the user 
group in all but the most unproductive years. The basic unit is called n!rir~ 
( 1 I I I •) p • n.ores1. . 
To move more deeply into the meaning of this term, it is necessary to 
recognize that the word n!dr~ is associated with a group of etymologically 
allied words carrying the primary sense "belonging to place." Snyman (1975) 
formulates a standardized orthography in which to couch the discussion; he 
also provides independent confirmation for my glosses of the lexical items to 
be considered. Placing the word n!brk within its etymological group will help 
clarify the conceptual connotation it has for 1u. The noun, n!Am, is trans-
lated into Afrikaans as plek by Snyman (1975:57); plek, in turn, is rendered 
place/position in English by Bosman et al. (1982:592) who associate it with 
the sense of location (plaas). The verb, n!Ang is glossed vasmaak (Snyman 
1975:57); Bosman et al. (19"82:817) translate this as attach/secure. As an 
adjective or preposition, n!Jng is given as binnekant (Snyman 1975:57), inside 
. ; t .,,, 
(Bosman et al. 1982:91); £oz: ~xample, g!un!ang combines g!u (water) plus 
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n!.lng, literally ''waterinside" = pan/well. All these words have the connota-
tion of attaching or securing something to its place. In contrast, the verb, 
\
1,i" , is used more casually to put (insit) or to· stick (insteek) (Afrikaans 
from Snyman 1975:98) something somewhere. A '{u person distinguishes between 
the use of n!!ng (to place) and · \'u' (to put) in a way analogous to the distin-
ction in English between "place it properly" and "put it there." Thus, n!brla 
may be glossed "place in land" and has the primary connotation of attaching 
persons properly inside locations of land. Snyman (1975:62) captures this 
sense in n!&rJ! xhijasi, land~re~s = land frontier/border [of a country) (Bos-
man et al. 1982:407). A tu l'hoa refers to some locality - some demarcated 
· land - as n!drl, mim~ (n!bre plus mi = self plus ma = possessive: my place), 
meaning the place where I belong/was born). 
There is, however, disagreement among anthropologists about the mechanisms 
of place affiliation. Marshall (1976:184) notes that a person, no matter 
where residing, identifies primarily with n!&r.! of origin (birthplace); Lee 
(1979:338) agrees. While this is true, it must not be construed to imply 
denial of rights in subsequently acquired n!6r.!si, as we shall see. Such 
identification is made to locate a person in an appropriate social geography; 
anyone familiar with that person's network will automatically fill in many 
kinship details without further prompting. N!br~ affiliation is said by Mar-
shall (1976: 184) to be inherited unilaterally through either parent. Lee 
(1979:338) says that inheritance may be unilateral, bilateral, or neolateral 
with a strong unilateral bias. Wiessner (1977: 50-51) says inheritance is 
strictly bilateral but that additional affiliations are acquired through mar-
riage. This lack of agreement arises because n!&r~ inheritance is considered 
by these authors to be primarily a means for associating individuals with 
geographic territory. 
Marshall (1960:344-345) brings a thoroughly commodity view to her depic-
tion of ~u relations to land. Although she does recognize that kinship plays 
a role in forming these relations, she holds that relative adequacy of resour-
ces causes people to flock around an "owner" of productive land. She has 
altered her view to the extent that she no longer thinks of an "owner" as a 
headman (1976: 191-195), but the resource function of tu spatial organization 
has been retained in her most recent presentation. Lee (1976:58, 334), too, 
defines n!~ri in resource terms - he again uses the word territory here as he 
did in his original discussion (Lee 1965:137-148) of what he then called 'fu 
territories. He has now reversed his interim view that have no concept of 
land ownership (Lee 1972) by asserting that "the !kung do own the land they 
occupy" (Lee 1979:337) but he does so in an anecdotal manner that puts him in 
a position indistinguishable from that of Marshall. Lee (1979: 58-63) envi-
sions a core group of owners who compete to recruit memners in order to in-
crease productive output (1979:457, 1982:53) and thus create a radiating chain 
of affines who may stay together for two generations or so (Lee 1979: 60-61). 
The main adhesive holding some people together while keeping them well spaced 
from others is personality (1982:52) and observance of rules of conduct 
(1979:338). The adhesive, however, dissolves in the unpredictability of rain-
fal 1 with its consequent variable resource production, this being a "powerful 
argument against territoriality" (Lee 1979:352) which induces ·!kung to "con-
sciously strive to maintain a boundaryless universe" (Lee 1979:335, original 
italics). In this contradictory ecology, Lee (1979:339) says "ownership of 
land passes from parent to child" (my emphasis). Even so, since he investi-
gates only one generation of such passages, he finds shallow and diffuse in-
heritance and guesses that a significant rate of moving about in the n!~r~si 
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occurred in pre-contact as well as in contact time (Lee 1979:338-339). It is 
true that Lee's respondents - all male - were of different ages and genera-
tions, but he reports inheritance from their immediate parents only, not for 
earlier or subsequent generations. 
But it is not land itself that is inherited. What actually is inherited 
is a set of status positions binding an individual to a network of obligations 
owed between. persons with respect to land. It is through this network of 
associations that persons become associated with geographic space. Among fu, 
a person's primary n:hr~ is always that person's birthplace. As I shall 
demonstrate, there is a very high probability that this birthplace will be in 
at least one parent's n:brJ. Thus, an individual iu's tenure rights in land 
are a dynamic function of a regional kinship net defined initially by ascrip-
tion through birth into a social unit and later expanded through acquistion of 
membership in other units either by marriage or adoption, Ascription is bila-
teral with rights at birth vested equally in the n:&r&si of both parents. 
Hitchcock (1980:24) documents the fact that in Botswana government offi-
cials invoke published work of anthropologists in support of their particular 
positions during debates over land reallocation. He specifically cites a case 
in which anthropological conclusions that San do not have territories in the 
classic ecologic sense were used by the then Commissioner of Land to argue 
that the San had no vested tenure rights in land and therefore had no basis 
for claims to land other than as a subject of resource exploitation, Simple 
resource exploitation is, of course, completely compatible with a squatter 
existence: use of land is appropriated by the currently present group, but 
tenure ·does not accrue. Lee (1979:337), by recognizing that fu land ownership 
is collective rather than individual, had the right answer for an African 
context. His discussion, however, obscures this collective ownership: "land 
• • • because it is owned by no one exclusively, is available to everyone who 
can use it" (Lee 1979:445). Lee clearly does not mean by this just everyone; 
he, of course, is thinking of foragers in a world of foragers - of ~u in a 
land of 'iu - despite his approving citation (1979: 16) of Sahlins' remark 
(1968: ) that such people could no longer be found. But policy makers do 
not think in terms of such isolated worlds; they think in terms of competing 
interest groups. In this context, customary tenure systems of all Botswana's 
people have subsequently been expressly recognized as a basis for adjudicating 
rights in land within the country (GOB 1978; Hitchcock 1980:24). We must 
establish that basis for San. To do so it is essential to elucide the kinship 
matrix in which San land tenure is set. I shall begin with the 'tu case. 
V ~ 
Zu I 'ho~i Kinship 
Since Marshall (1957), no one has reported fundamental work on ~u kinship 
and marriage. Fabian (1965) and Barnard (1978) identify contradictions in her 
work, and Marshall (1957:14) herself noted that some critical points remained 
to be clarified. The contradictions, however, do not lie in ~u kinship rela-
tions as has been supposed. A thorough reconsideration of ~u kinship and 
marriage is in preparation (Wilmsen, forthcoming); only the essential outlines 
necessary to comprehend the active dialectic among tu kinship, marriage, and 
inheritance of land will be presented here, Marshall (1957) gives male_; 
centered consanguineal terms correctly; however, her decision to exclude 
kin-term suffixes, which she considered to be strictly diminuatives (despite 
the fact that the suffix n:'i• a' [n!a in her spelling] means big), led her 
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astray, especially in association with her second decision to adopt an exclu-
sively male egocentric paradigm. She was consequently unable to discern the 
systematic relation between terms, especially those applied to affines. Nor 
did she recognize the reciprocity in male and female centered terms which lie 
at the terminological heart of transformation from kin to affine. 
To facilitate comparison with Marshall's work, I will enter ~LI. terminology 
through male-centered terms for consanguines and then move on to the female-
centered paradigm. Marshall's Diagram l (1957: 6) gives these male-centered 
terms correctly; Figure 1 is an expanded kinship diagram which incorporates 
those terms in the standard orthography of Snyman (1975). Figure 2 is a near-
ly identical diagram to which have been applied female-centered terms. AB is 
readily apparent, terms in ego I s adjacent generations are the same for both 
sexes, and there are only two: g l\a (adjacent generation female co lateral), 
parent's female sibling and generational equivalent plus sibling I s and cou-
sin's female child and equivalent, and tsb (adjacent generation male colat-
eral), parent's male sibling and generational equivalent plus sibling's and 
cousin's male child and equivalent. In ego's and alternating generations, 
however, there is a fundamental difference; terms here are linked to gender of 
ego. For males, male offspring of tsbs i-gll as i are in the ! 6'. (name) relation-
ship as are female offspring of these parents for female ego. Notice that in 
her Diagram 1, Marshall makes female ego's parent's fathers as well as all 
male cousins !~n!'i 1 ~ to her; as 1u names are gender-linked, this cannot be 
true in the consanguineal terminology, although, as we shall see, it is true 
in the affinal terminology. 
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Complimentary to this !~ relationship is a txu' relationship which is also 
ge~der-linked: opposite sex,persons in ego's and alternating generations are 
t~g!A to female ego and txl'lmi\. to male ego. Again, Marshall assigns affinal 
terms in, the female consanguineal paradigm, as she must do having placed male 
cousins in the!~ category. 
It is important to summarize at this point. In ego's first ascending genera-
tion, all father's brothers (FB) and all mother's brothers (MB) are termed tsh 
by both male and female ego; in this generation, all father's sisters (FZ) and 
all mother's sisters (MZ) are termed wla by both sexes. These terms are also 
applied to male and female kin, respectively, in generations alternate to this 
one. In ego's generation, however, male ego applies the term !~ with appro-
priate suffix to all male offspring of both parent's siblings (FBS, FZS, MBS, 
MZS) as well as to all male relatives in parent's parent's (FF, MF, etc.) and 
children's children's (SS, DS, etc.) generations; in these generations, female 
ego applies the same term to the female counterpart~ of these persons (MZD, 
MBD, FZD, FBD, MM, FM, etc.). Male ego applies txuma to females iljl these 
generations (FBD, FZD, MBD, MZD, FM, MM, etc.); female ego applies txitg!A to 
their male counterparts (MZS, MBS, FZS, FBS, MF, FF, etc.). As Figures land 
2 make clear, these terms are indefinitely extended both laterally and verti-
cally. · 
• _,!, It "' '\ It is also important to notr. that txug.a and txuma are not primitive terms 
but are compounds of a stem, txtl, and a suffix, g!a or ma. The stem component 
will be considered when affinal terms are introduced. At this point, glosses 
for the suffixes are not entirely certaJ-n• That they are not strictly diminu-
tives is clear from the fact that txug!J is always used no matter what the 
1 . f . Ai,. Th . l re~at1,ve ages o persons, as 1.s txuma 1.n most cases. ere 1.s a so no 
txun!.!' ~- The morpheme ma is a diminuative, but it is also a possesive 
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(Snyman 1975:42); for example, dshau mima = my wife. The morpheme g!a is 
never diminutive but may be derived· from g!, a possessive (Snyman 1975:10), as 
in ~usi o mi g!si = my relatives. Both ma and g!a also appear to have gender 
marking functions. 
Support for the possessive character of these suffixes is found in the 
term mkm},_yhich Marshall (1957:15) notes is used as a term of affection, as is 
also !lin!1' a. But it is also · a kin term denoting parents' mother (Snyman 
1975:43 gives grandmother). The stem, m!, is associated with a whole set of 
lexical items (Snyman 1975:42-44) expressing incorporation in a group: i = us, 
ma = own child, ma•J = to 1;,ive birth or to carry a child (J. Marshall finds 
only this second gloss), mhisi = own children, mi= self, and the possessives 
ma and mas in mba = my father; m!una, thus, is a reflexive possessive that may 
be glossed "she who bore us" or 11she who carries us. 11 
For purposes of understanding ~u marriage and inheritance prescriptions, 
these are the only consanguineal terms that need be considered. Affinal terms 
are· given under thr.ir consapguineal counterparts in Figures 1 and 2. Notice 
first that the tx~g!J - txlnnl reciprocal pair has affinal as well as consaq-
guineal denotations: upon marriage into a grovp, a man's consanguineal txu-
m~si in that group remain his, affinal txuinasi, but his consangjineal 
!Un!i'~si/!fun1si become affinal txUg!!si. In 1,.tke manner, a woman's txug!!si 
remain as such while her :,f relations become txumasi. For both sexes, consan-
guineal ts& becomes father of spouse and is terme~-,1,.xlim as a.re all other affi-
nalized tsb.. It has already been noted that tx\l'g! A and txuma are compounds; 
it should now be apparent that they share the stef ,bx~ (or perhaps xb.) with 
'=f.xlnn. This stem may be glossed "in-law"; thus, txtt'g! 1 and txiiin.>i are then seen 
to be "belonging to in-law." 
There are only three other affinal terms, and these are also compounds. 
The consanguineal g\la (when married to tsh) becomes J•~tsli (from gu = take, 
marry+ tsb, hence wife of tsb). Parents of child's spouse are !~ntae (name+ , . 
tae = mother, hence name-mother) and !unba (name + my father, hence name-
father). Notice that these two affines were respectively already in the con-
sanguineal !~ name relation with the same sex parent of child's spouse: !u'ntae 
was !Un!i•~ to child's spouse's mother and !~nba was in the same relationship 
to the father. ~• of course, opposite sex parents of this offspring pair 
had been in the txu relation. This set of co-parents-in-law contains the four 
persons for whom their children's children will usually be named, hence the 
terms name-mother and name-father. These co-parents-in-law apply the term 
!tim& to all their mutual grandchildren regardless of sex (Wilms,i'n, forth-
coming, gives the reason) by whom they are reciprocally ·called !fm!l!'.'.l. Thus, 
the puzzling aspects of the name relation (Marshall 1957: 7-14) becomes more 
clear; this system operates in a straightforward way, not only to override 
consanguineal relations, but to recognize terminologically a bilateral consan-
guineal kin group. 
We may now consider !u marriage prescriptions. Any opposite sex, same 
generation descendant of ego's parent's parent's sibling <1:cscc) or 1 parent's 
parent's parent's sibling (PPPsCCC) is called by a term (txug!! - tx'u~) that 
connotes persons "belonging to in-laws" and such persons - and only such per-
sons plus their terminological equivalents in alternate generations - are 
permissable marriage partners and sexual mates. Appropriately, Marshall 
(1957:21) notes that a joking relationship exists between these persons. She 
(1957! 19) also records that persons in a joking relation and who apply the 
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reciprocal tx'ii terms to each other are permissable marriage partners. Persons 
in this category who are most likely to be available for marriage to ego will 
be ego I s PPsCC and/or PPPsCCC but the relationship may extend further colla-,-
terally. The name relation, as illustrated above, serves to reduce the proba-
bility of first cousin (PsC) marriages because both partners will have a prim-
ary name-relative pair (grandparents) in common. It does not eliminate such 
marriages, however; for example, in Figure 1, ego's brother may have married 
his MBD, but he more likely married his MMBDD or perhaps his MMMBDDD or even 
his MMFMBSDDD. The lines of reckoned descent will be orchestrated by the 
principals to the marriage a'rcording to.L their perceived interests. Adjacent 
generation primary kin of txuin'lisi - txug !.lsi are never eligible mates for 
them, are also accorded respect, and, after being linked through a marriage, 
are addressed by an in-law possessive term (-4:xlnn - ['utsd) by affinal ego. 
Marshall (1960:332-333) provides some evidence that this is indeed the· 
system operating among the people she studied. Her Figure 3 is a chart of 
partial relationships among 108 persons in what she calls 8 band segments. 
Among these persons, there are 58 spouses of whom 19 are without information 
regarding their kin; of the remaining 39, 37 have at least one primary kin 
link (parent or sibling) in the group. As this information is confined large-
ly to a single generation (there are only 8 living persons in the eldest of 3 
generations shown and only 5 marriages in the youngest) and is, no doubt, also 
incomplete (an unknown number of persons is said to have been omitted), this 
number of links is even higher than may have been expected. Furthermore, 
Marshall (1960:344) confesses that she has no data on second and third cousin 
relationships, therefore can say nothing about marriages among so related 
persons. In the single case she gives that can be worked out, 25-tsamgao is 
engaged to marry 54-kushay his MFBSD, as he should. 
This discussion has been sharply abbreviated; it is enough, however, to 
make it fully apparent that :¥'u marriage takes place within a clearly defined 
kin coterie in which affines are simply recategorized kin. This overlapping 
of consanguinity and affinity distorts any assumption of a dichotomy between 
these categories. There are different lines of reckoning kin, and a person 
falls into one or the other. category according to contingencies of the mo-
ment. Kinship in · society, rather than being a static strait-jacket, is a 
dynamic keyboard on which individuals play variations on a theme of options. 
It is, as Comaroff (1980:164) notes, up to the individual to "create and man-
age an effective social network." 
✓ I ;,., Zu 'hoasi Land Ownership 
Within this incoporative structure of l'u kinship the corporate unity of ~u 
land holding devolves from one generation to the next. Property right trans-
fers consequent on marriage are, accordingly, largely matters of reshuffling 
priorities among latent claims by members of a kin consort. Negotiations and 
legitimation of marriage ties are important moments in this creative process. 
To compress Bourdieu (1977:35-36, original emphasis): to treat kin relations 
as something people make, and with which they do something, is not merely to 
substitute a "functionalist" for a "structuralisi:'' interpretation; it is radi-
cally to question the theory of kin relationships as a "form of object" as 
Marx put it. 
In this perspective, fu bride service can be seen not in the decontextua-
lized structural-functionalis.t terms usually offered. (Lee 1979:240-242, 
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1982:42-43) but as a form of devolutionary marriage payment which mediates the 
conflicts over land that inevitably must occur among mutually interdependent 
groups. San bride service has long been recognized as marriage payment in 
traditional Tswana law and is specifically related to bogadi, the Tswana form 
of marriage payment. In 1930, Tshekedi, then regent of the Bamangwato, testi-
fied before the British Resident Commissioner, "Bogadi [marriage payment] is a 
tradition and a right of Masarwa [San]: bride service of one or two years or, 
if a man owns cattle, he can pay in stock" (Botswana National Archives 1930). 
Schapera (1970:138) notes that when, in 1875 under missionary influence, Khama 
III abolished bogadi among the Ngwato he specifically did not ban the practice 
among his other subjects including San who continued to practice their tradi-
tional forms of marriage payment. 
For fu, bride service resolves the question of personal status and locates 
a marriage union with its offspring within the structure of relations between 
persons and places. The devolution of property begins with negotiations and 
pres tat ions between principals to a future marriage, primarily future co-
parents-in-law. Wiessner shows this process in action through hxaro (Snyman 
1975:88 writes xkr6) prestations primarily of beadwork and other symbolically 
·valued materials. This process may extend over a period of many years, as 
Marshall (1960:351-352) and Lee (1979:240-242) confirm. Devolution begins to 
take more concrete form with the establishment of a new household located in 
association with the woman's parents. The period of bride service is measured 
in t·erms of offspring, its conditions having been satisfied when two or more 
children have been born to the union. 
Children born during this period in the woman's n!br~ will have as their 
primary n!br~ that locality. This confers lifelong mutual obligations between 
the woman's natal group and those children, and, indeed, on their descen-
dants. It is the inheritance of land that is at issue in this service, not 
some few piec-es of meat that a newly recruited hunter may provide. Lee 
(1979 :240) stresses the surface function of hunting prowess - he refers to 
bride service as a period of probation for the man - and fails, thereby, to 
comprehend its deeper significance. Economics and nutrition are, of course, 
unassailable necessities in corporal and social life, but the large · animal 
that the young husband is expected to kill and present to his parents-in-'law 
provides not only protein and calories; more importantly it symbolically med-
iates the new relational status of families. 
That it is not hunting ability per se that is - specifically at stake is 
confirmed by the fact that domestic animals (either owned or obtained from 
employers - or even purchased with mine labor wages [Lee 1979:241]) are read-
ily substituted for hunted animals. Such substitution does not, however, free 
the husband from uxorilocal residence obligations. This transferred animal, 
hunted or herded, should be seen as a signifier of commitment by the parties 
concerned (acceptance is as much an active act as is giving) and has its ana-
logue in the transferred mokwele animal among the Tswana (Comaroff and Coma-
roff 1981:34). An employed man may more easily evade his commitment than is 
possible for his hunting brother, but he knows this commitment is reciprocal. 
Half the social and material support for his household resides in his wife's 
social matrix, for he not only shares with them, they share with him. He may 
manage his end of the committment differently, but ultimately his status dev-
olves in the kinship defined network of n!bd, relations. Without that base, 
he has no status. 
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During the period of bride service, devolutionary rights in husband's 
n!bri are kept open by visiting his primary kin who reside there; after that 
period, if household residence changes to husband's n!br.!, rights in wife's 
n!Jri are kept open by visiting her kin who remain there. Such visiting is 
undertaken not only to enjoy each other's company. Lee (1979:377, 389-391) 
documents that nearly 70% of all homicides occur when groups are visiting each 
other and that a high proportion of fights and killings occur between af-
fines. These risks are counterbalanced by the need to keep options open 
through active participation in social relations to land; expectably, many 
conflicts arise in disputes over the exercise of those options, although they 
may be masked as simple marital disputes. 
It is probable that the frequency - and, perhaps, the violence - of such 
¥u disputes has increased under colonially induced disruptions of relations to 
land. But the source of these disputes - in the interpretation of rights and 
obligations - must always have been present. 'l;o paraphrase Sahlins (1976:9): 
foragers are not related by the way they enter into production; they thus 
enter into production by the way they are related. For foragers - as for 
anyone else - these relations, if they are to persist, must be unambiguously 
expressed even if they are ambiguously practiced. "Because the status of 
property holdings and exchanges conveys a range of messages concerning social 
linkages and individual rights, their definition and designation are always 
critical to the parties involved" (Comaroff ei'd Roberts 1981: 175). It is in 
this dialectic of structure and practice that zu regulation of ownership lies. 
It is now possible to demonstrate that {u kinship and land tenure are 
stable in space. To begin with, the majority of tu marriages take place bet-
ween people who live in closely contiguous n!,hl.si. Harpending (1976:161) 
plots marital distances for a large number of marital pairs who are parents, 
that is, whose marriages have been stable. These data, regrouped into inter-
vals of 30km, are displayed in Table L Harpending stresses the large dis-
tances over which marriages may take place. Equally striking, however, is the 
fact that 53% of all partners were married within 30km of their birthplaces 
and 78% within 60km; in other words, more than half of all marriage partners 
were born within the same n!br~ space and more than three-quarters within the 
same or adjacent n!hrisi as were their spouses. In addition, Harpending 
( 1976: 161) states, without citing evidence, that parent-offspring birthplace 
distances (distance between birthplace of respondent and that of respondent's 
parents or children) are even less dispersed. Supporting evidence is provided 
by Lee (1979:338) who found that 77% of his respondents inherited their 
n!br~si from one or both parents. To this may be added that Wiimsen 
(1976:4-7) documents five generation continuity of kin-based owner groups at 
lailai. 
Thus, the probabilty of a lu\'h~a being born in parent's ancestral land is 
at least 0.8. This is precisely the result that one would expect under a 
structural system that incorporates primary relatives into spatial entities 
and puts co.laterals into contiguous units linked through prescribed recipro-
cal, bilateral marriage. A high degree of generational continuity of tenured 
family groups is evident from these data. If anything, events of recent his-
tory, which have introduced pressures from European and mfecane induced move-
ments, have reduced these probabilities. For. example, these pressures are 
responsible, in conjunction with ecological changes that may be linked to a 
more intensive pastoralist land use keyed to market production for bringing 
half of the current rural inhabitants of Western Ngamiland to their current 
places of residence. 
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Exchange networks play important integrative roles in this social-spatial 
structure. Wiessner (1977:119, 178; 1982) found that 62% of x.!trb partners 
(persons who engage in preferential, reciprocal, obligatory exchange) are 
tracable to same grandparents and 82% to same great-grandparents. Given the 
marriage prescription and spatial distribution noted, these people will be 
contiguous, consanguineal relatives among whom are potential as well as actual 
affines. Wiessner (1977:246) gives the spatial distribution of x!r& partners 
by area and distance for a sample of people residing at \ai I ai and at 
Tchumk!o'e in Namibia; these data are displayed - also grouped in 30km inter-
vals - in Table 1. Inspection of this table reveals that 48% and 55%, respec-
tively, of x!r& in these two places is transacted within the home location, 
and 70% and 67% within 60km of that location, that is, within same or adjacent 
n!brJ. Wiessner (personal communication) finds that a high proportion of this 
exchange is associated with marriage negotiations. 
Figure 4 combines these data and demonstrates graphically that kinship, 
space, and exchange describe an interlocking system of status relationships in 
which individuals are bound within a set of reciprocal obligations among per-
sons and things. The internal boundaries within this system are zonal rather 
than incisional but are well known and are open to those with appropriate 
social ties. Ownership - in the sense in which I have been speaking - is 
vested in all members of a group who apply a reflexive set of reciprocal terms 
to each other and refer to themselves as "people who own [have] each other" 
(Marshall 19 76: 214). It is this group of people who form the stable set of 
descendant owners of a place. They are the n!brla K' ausi (possessors of 
place); that is, they are those who have generationally continuous, inherent 
rights of tenure in their ancestral land. 
Other San systems 
Schapera (1943:5-7) speaks of "this system of land tenure characteristic 
of Bushmen" in exactly this way. The compatibility of other San tenure sys-
tems may be indicated quickly. Table 2 lists cognate terms for locational 
place in six San languages plus Nama; all of these terms are clearly derived 
from a common root. Traill (personal communication) has confirmed the essen-
tial meaning to be locative, referring to a person's or group's possessed 
place. Common origin and common meaning do not, however, guarantee that terms 
are parts of otherwise identical systems; other evidence must be called in 
support. Silberbauer (1981:99) records that glwi attitudes to land are cen-
tered on "the fact that the primary bond is between the individual and his 
band, whereas the link between the individual and territory is derived from 
the bond between community and land • • • rights • • • flow from band member-
ship." Land ownership is vested in band members for whom elders act as inter-
mediaries when non-members enter and ask to use the land, "a formality that 
clearly indicates that the use of territorial resources and residence have to 
be granted before they are gained" (Silberbauer 1981:141). On the question of 
the social determinates of membership, however, Silberbauer is not so clear. 
He applies a normative, rule-centered approach to his strictly ecological 
frame of reference and looks for lineal descent groups with namable ancestors 
and finds only shallow lineages in this sense. Nevertheless, he recognizes 
that, inevitably, real and classificatory kinship links are established and a 
high probability of a kinship bond among members exists (Silberbauer 
1981 :142). It is apparent that this high probability is the product of glwi 
marriage arrangements in which bilateral cross-cousins are preferred mates. 
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Silberbauer (1981: 183) lists 34 relationship positions covered by the term 
glossed cross-cousin including - in addition to MBD and FZD - MMBsn·, FFZDD, 
MMMBSSD, FFFZDDD plus others into the fourth ascending generation. He con-
fines his analysis, however, to first cousin marriages despite the fact that 
all first marriages are between terminological cross-cousins (Silberbauer 
1981:149-150); he, of course, finds relatively few current first cousin unions 
among adult males but tells us nothing about the status of other-cousin 
unions. Without going into further detail, it is apparent that this cannot be 
either a shallow or a divisive system. For any ego to know that a descendant 
of a person probably long dead and never met (perhaps never having been speci-
.fically mentioned), along with terminological equivalents of that descendant, 
is a potential mate the system must be comprehended in considerable depth and 
detail. This requires membership in a group that is stable - although not 
necessarily static - in person and place. Fragments of texts from the girl's 
menarcheal ceremony (Silberbauer 1981:151-152) makes it clear that such stabi-
lity is, in fact, conceptually inherent and actually realized in the g I wi 
point of view. Tanaka (1980:127-134) presents data that conforms to this 
analysis. He demonstrates that residence groups are tied in a regular manner 
to kinship: of his residential groups, 11 (N = 18) contain 20 parent-child 
links, 9 have 14 sibling links, while only 3 have no kin ties to the rest of 
the total group (note that 2 of these are composed of a single married pair 
each). He shows, further, that primary kin ties link adjacent groups and that 
the relationship among residence units is structured in space as a direct 
function of kinship distance. 
Cashd~ (19 77: 22-24) states that "Among the Bag l\ anakwe, a person has an 
automatic right of access to an area that is part of his 'lefatshe' (ngo) 
meaning I place I or 'territory 1 • 11 (The term lefatshe is Setswana; ngo is 
g \l ana.) She discusses the process of the inheritance of land based upon 
"birth and/or residence and/or parentage" and makes clear the kinship matrix 
which controls access to land, whether for resource exploitation or residence, 
noting that "the absence of [a claim to kinship] may prevent a person from 
choosing to use an area even if it is geographically convenient." 
,,.., 
Heinz (1972, 1979) documents an equivalent system for the !><DC> as does 
Barnard (1979) for the Nharon. Barnard (1979:72-75) details the devolutionary 
nature of transferral of rights among Nharon: "Kamane, or marriage and child-
birth prestations, mark the change in the disposition of rights over indivi-
duals." Gifts are exchanged during negotiations for marriage, at marriage, 
and at the birth of first child, People are said to be "owned" by their 
grandparents, ownership being inherited bilaterally. Kamane symbolically 
mediates transfer of sexual and residence rights at marriage and establishment 
of primary rights at birth, As among tu, Nharo marriage prestations enter the 
larger gift giving cycle where they serve to reinforce the continuous associa-
tion of persons and place. The case for the Ghanzi area of these people has 
historical documentation: Hahn (1895) concludes the report of his investiga-
tion for the Imperial Secretary, Cape Town as follows, "Ghanse can only be 
claimed by the Bushman, who admittedly and indisputably from time immemorial 
lived on it and never left it." Heinz (1972:412) records the fact that even 
today Ghanzi ranchers recognize the San land divisions that intersect their 
own holdings and employ San in relation to those land divisions. Identical 
systems for the Kwaa (Hitchcock 1978, 1980) and Tsaase (Vierich-Esch 1982; 
Hitchcock 1978) in eastern Botswana are recorded. Hitchcock (1980: 25-26) 
emphasizes that even today local. Ngwato ward-heads and cattle owners respect 
San land ownership; if only to the extent of consulting San owners before 
using the land for their own purposes, · 
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Herero Land Tenure 
The relevant features of Herero land tenure will be summarized briefly. 
The principal unit is the onganda, a settlement unit constituted by a set of 
patrilineal affiliates with their wives and children; matrilineal kinsmen and 
affines may be included and may even be more numerous but never organization-
ally dominant (Gibson 1959). 0zonganda have associated sections of land for 
grazing in which are located ozohambo (sing,, ohambo), cattleposts conjoined 
to water sources of varying permanence. 
' Almagor (1980:50) vividly documents that a Herero's rights in land are 
traced exclusively through kin networks, Rights to pasture derive from the 
concept of locality; a person attached to a specific locality cannot utilize 
another locality except by activating the structural links among individuals 
(Almagor 1978; Luttig 1933:96-97), A person's identification with natal 
household and locality is lifelong but links to kindred households and locali-
ties may be invoked to change residence. Ownership - again in the sense used 
in this paper - of land and chattels is vested in the kindred group (Vedder 
1938; Luttig 1933:96-97), Marriage is prescribed among bilateral cross-
cousins and children are born preferentially in mother's natal onganda to 
affirm the spatial-social solidarity among generations of the group (Luttig 
1933:69). Possessive particles are applied to persons and things, and, once 
established, rights to land, water sources, and chattals remain in the group: 
The wells at /gi, for example, are the contemporary states of natural springs 
which have been progressively deepened by Herero since the mid-1930's; each 
well has passed in ownership among a set of patrilineally related men. Fur-
ther, the division of the grazing land among the cattle owners of the /ai/ai -
Herero, 1u, and Tswana - is such that each set of households has its own sec-
tion. Similar settlement-tenure rules have been described for the Bakgalahadi 
(Campbell and Child 1971; Hitchcock and Campbell 1980), 
Institutional Equity of Tenure Systems 
Despite significant differences in detail, the underlying principals of 
affiliation and legitimization are compatible among these systemns with Tswana 
institutions of land tenure. Schapera (1943:46-59) encapsulates the essential 
determinates of place in Tswana law: the location of a Motswana I s home is 
determined primarily by group affiliation not by income, occupation, or social 
ambition. Tribal land is apportioned among social units constituted as wards 
under the administration of headmen. The basis for establishing a ward was 
initially kinship or ethnic identity, although this is no longer invariably 
the case, Areas mofatshe (rights to use specific sections of land) are allo-
cated to members of a ward and may be passed to descendants, but the land 
remains the property of the tribe under the administration of the chief and 
his headmen. Rights are acquired by membership in. the tribe and are activated 
by application to the headman. of the ward to which one belongs (Schapera 
1938: 195-213; BNA 1958). Schapera (1963: 164-169) further notes that in pre-
colonial times fission as a result of tenure disputes was common among Tswana 
for ~ho~, iri. such cases, assassination or succession were the principal re-
courses, As a Motswana recently put it, "it's just that we moved around a lot 
looking for good land" (Kiyaga-Mulindwa 1980 :85). Thus, it would appear that, 
before direct colonial intervention, San and Tswana tenurial systems had as 
much in common as they now superficially appear to lack. 
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The- important thing to note is the structural_ commonality of land tenure 
among San, Herera, and Tswana, The only conclusion that can be reached is 
that San tenure has been, and continues to attempt to be, generationally sta-
ble and sanctioned by traditional native rules that are congruent with other 
southern African systems. The basis of rights to land is membership in a 
kinship group whose history is associated with a specific parcel of geographic 
space. The fact that related person's are admitted to an owner group's land 
in order to share ecological resources reinforces, rather than weakens, the 
fact of tenure rights based in group sociality. For only certain persons who 
can claim participation in the social polity are admitted, and then only after 
they present their kinship credentials for examination. 
Multi-tiered ownership of places and things have characterized the remem-
bered and recorded past. Space associated with one particular group was lay-
ered upon that of other groups. This was possible, not because of some altru-
istic urge for accomodation, but because the tenure systems of the different 
competing peoples. were intelligible to each other and their ecological req-
uirements were to some extent complimentary rather than conflicting, Dis-
placement and display were the usual modes of defense of these tenures, with 
considerable negotiation based on detailed examination of genealogies given an 
important part in the process (cf, Comaroff 1973), Fights over land did, and 
do, occur, of course; all of the cases given by Lee (1979:336-338) for the San 
illustrate this, although he chooses to interpret them as revealing paucity of 
structure rather than structural articulations of persons in place. The lit-
erature of conflict for the Herera is vast (Vedder 1938; Tlou 1972, 1976; 
Estermann 1976) as is that for the Tswana (Parsons 1982 gives an extensive 
summary). And the history of subjugation of San by Tswana is well documented 
( Tagart 1933; Joyce 1938; Tlou 1977; Silberbauer and Kuper 1966; Hitchcock 
1978), Nevertheless, a striking feature of current settlement in the Kalahari 
is its continuity - a continuity that transcends time and space and ethnicity 
despite some major displacements of peoples, The current distribution of 
groups in the region is clearly the product of a very long process of inter-
action involving congruent social concepts and complimentary economic sys-
tems, If this were not the case, current debates within Botswana over the 
reallocation of tenure rights (Hitchcock 1980; Wilmsen 1982a; Kerven 1982 
gives extensive overviews) would not be necessary, These systems were able to 
maintain their inte~ty until disrupted by the penetration of commodity capi-
talism in this century. It appears that even during the initial colonial 
period of mercantile capitalism in the nineteenth century, they were able to 
retain significant parts of their former structures which - though continually 
modified in relation to each other - continue to be realized today. 
This analysis has brought us back to where we started. Thus far, in con-
sidering social relations to land of peoples such as foragers who are con-
ceived to exist in an uncomplicated past made present, we have been led by our 
own concepts of natural order and by our own ideological investment of the 
nature of relations; these are the products of our own creative reasoning, We 
must now turn to the creative reasoning of those we presume to study, whose 
concepts of natural order and whose ideological investment are of a different 
nature of relations, If we succeed in this intellectual effort, we may better 
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Fig, 2. Kinship terminology: female ego, Terms as in Fig. 1, 
0 = 
flHsll =t=xfrn, gila  tsu 
l:,. = 
!:t·· 1 :~t~:i 
0 = 

























= 6 I !U~!li'a 
txUmll 
l:,. = 0 




= 6 1 = 




































tsu I gila 


















u = .6. ... r·j'Utsll =t=xUm 
b. = 
txli: !lln!:'.i'a 




txfig!.i !Un!3'a txfig!.i 




i1 l!U111,i'[  
.--------c----------------.L.---------------------, 













Fig. 3. Alternate lines of reckoning kinship relations 
between one set of marriage partners depicted in Fig. 1. 
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Fig. 4. Frequency of distribution of individuals at given distances. 
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